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Crahan: Crahan: Expansion of Permissive Joinder of Defendants in Missouri
PERMISSIVE JOINDER

EXPANSION OF PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF
DEFENDANTS IN MISSOURI
I.

INTRODUCTION

Identification of all persons who may properly be joined as parties
defendant is one of the first tasks of the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff
may at his option join any or all of those so identified because the trial
court is without discretion to refuse joinder if the requirements of the
permissive joinder rule are met.1 The attorney's confidence in his determination of which persons are proper parties will vary according to
two factors: the clarity of judicial interpretations of the rule and his
understanding of the influence that the policy considerations underlying
the rule will have upon the manner in which the court will apply the
interpretations to the facts of his case.
From 1953, when the Missouri Supreme Court decided State ex rel.
Campbell v. James,2 until recently, the interpretation of the language
of this rule was clear.3 Unfortunately, that interpretation was also narrow
and inconsistent with the free joinder policy of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure from which the rule's language was derived.4 In 1975, State
ex rel. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Murphy5 expressly overruled the
Campbell interpretation. The court adopted a construction of the rule
which is more in harmony with the liberal joinder policies of the federal
courts, but which lacks the clarity of Campbell.6 In Hager v. McGlynn"
the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals also recognized
and endorsed this liberal joinder policy while construing a different portion of the rule's language. However, the interpretation announced by
the court may not be justified by the language of the rule even in light

1. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.05 (a) provides:
*.. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrences or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
Although the rule as adopted is phrased "transaction, occurrences ... ." the supreme court clearly demonstrated its view that this deviation from the wording of
federal rule 20 (a) is a typographical error by its use of "[sic)" following the reprint
of the rule in the Farmers opinion. For clarity, "occurrences!' has been changed
to "occurrence" in the remainder of this comment where appropriate.
2. 263 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. En Banc 1953).
3. See pt. II of this comment, infra.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (a) contains identical language.
5. 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
6. See pt. III of this comment, infra.
7. 518 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
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of this policy and seems to be inconsistent with other established policies
underlying venue, consolidation, and personal jurisdiction. 8
The purpose of this comment is to identify the critical factual criteria
for permissive joinder common to these recent decisions and to examine
their impact on permissive joinder in Missouri. References to the construction of federal rule 20 (a) by the federal courts has expressly been
made relevant to this inquiry by both courts and will be made where
appropriate. The interaction of venue and personal jurisdiction with
joinder, which was not examined by the Hager court, will also be explored and contrasted with the court's analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
The "same transaction" and common question requirements for
joinder of parties originated in England in 18969 while American courts
were struggling with the then widely accepted Field Code provisions.1 0
The English courts, emphasizing the underlying policy reflected by the
provisions for free joinder of claims, have liberally interpreted the "same
transaction" language and avoided the conclusion that the joinder of
parties provisions are restricted by the previous "same form of action"
or "same subject of action" requirements."1 When very similar provisions
were adopted in New York, however, the New York Court of Appeals
reached the opposite conclusion.' 2 This interpretation has been strenuously criticized by the commentators's as overly restrictive, but was still
accepted in New York when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
drafted. Professor Charles Wright, as noted by the court in Farmers, has

stated flatly that it should be clear that the purpose of the Advisory Committee in adding the word "occurrence" to the rule was not to add a new
concept but to prevent such narrow interpretations of the transaction
language.1 4
8. See pt. IV of this comment, infra.
9. English Rules Under the Judicature Act of 1896, o. 16, rr. 1, 4, 5 [now
o. 15, r. 4].
10. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1651

(1972).
11. Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. I (C.A.); Oesterreichische Export A.G. v. British Indemnity Ins. Co., [1914] 2 K.B. 747 (C.A.);
Compania Sansinsena de Carnes Congeladas v. Houlder Bros. & Co., [1910] 2 K.B.
354 (C.A.); Bullock v. London General Omnibus Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 264 (C.A.).
12. Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925).
.13. 7 C. WRIGHT 9- A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1653

(1972); F.

JAmEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE

465 (1965); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the

Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81
HARv. L. REV. 591, 597 (1968); Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rulemaking Power: A Dissent and a Protest, I SYRACUSE L. REV. 346, 358 (1950).
14. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading,38 MINN. L. REv. 423, 449 n.121 (1954).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1966 in response to
what was believed to be an erroneous interpretation of the language by the
court in Federal Housing Adm'r v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939),
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Missouri adopted the General Code of Civil Procedure which contained joinder provisions identical to the federal rules in 1948.15 In
1949, in Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville'6 the supreme court interpreted
the compulsory counterclaim provisions of the new code, which also
contained the "same transaction" language found in the joinder sections.
The supreme court specifically noted the origin of the language in the
federal rules and cited federal authority 17 for the proposition that "same
transaction or occurrence" must be given a liberal interpretation. However, in 1953 the court decided State ex rel. Campbell v. James's which
commentators have described as an unnecessarily strict interpretation of
the "same transaction" language of the joinder rule. 19

In Campbell the plaintiffs owned property which was allegedly
damaged by explosions. Suit was first brought against the alleged tort-

feasors. The plaintiff's insurance companies, whose policies covered the
property in question, intervened, but the suits were dropped. Plaintiffs
then brought an action which joined the tortfeasors and the insurance

companies. The supreme court found that the parties were improperly
joined. The court based its interpretation on a strict reading of the rule

without reference to the history of the language. Although Cantrell was
cited for the proposition that "transaction" had been given a broad

meaning in this state,2 0 the court flatly stated that "transaction" and
"occurrence" were not synonymous or interchangeable. Joinder was held

to be improper because the action against the tortfeasors was in trespass,
or an "occurrence," whereas the action against the insurance companies
was in contract, or a "transaction." Because the statute treated "trans-

action" and "occurrence" in the disjunctive, the court reasoned that both
causes of action must arise from a single transaction or a single occurrence.
That each cause of action arose from the same event-i.e., the explosion,

and presented common questions of law and fact (coincidentally, accordwhich read the permissive joinder rule as placing a limitation on the rule for
joinder of claims. The amendment and the Advisory Committee notes thereto
make it clear that permissive joinder is a separate question and, once parties have
been properly joined, any number of claims may be asserted against an opposing
party, regardless of whether they arise out of the same transaction. See Advisory
Committee Notes following FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 28 U.S.C.A.
15. Mo. LAws 1943, at 353, 360, 370, §§ 16, 37. Joinder provisions were substantially similar to Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.05 (a), 55.06 (a), which supercede all previous statutes pursuant to Mo. Sup. CT. R. 41, issued by the supreme court under
the authority of article V of the Missouri constitution.
16. 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949).
17. Id. at 287, 221 S.W.2d at 474; Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270
U.S. 593 (1926); Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
18. 263 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. En Banc 1953).
19. Wheaton, The New General Code for Civil Procedure and Supreme
Court Rules Interpreted, 19 Mo. L. REv. 372, 873-74; 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, RULES EDITION § 533 (Wright ed. 1961). But see
Volz & Blackmar, Beneficial Aspects of the Civil Code of Missouri, 3 ST. Louis LJ.
334, 343 (1955), citing Campbell as restrictive but not unduly so.
20. 263 S.W.2d at 407.
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ing to the court) was found not to be controlling because each cause of
action "arises out of a separate legal right, neither of which is dependent
upon the other for its existence.' 21 The source of the requirement of
identity of legal rights invaded was not apparent in the decision. Because the statute is phrased in terms of "transactions" or "occurrences"
rather than rights, this appears to have been a holdover from common
law or code pleading rather than any statutory requirement. This narrow
construction of the statute was continued by the supreme court and court
22
of appeals until the decision in Farmers.

III. STATE EX REL. FARmERS INS. CO. v. MURPHY2 3

A.

The Case

Richard Allen, driving south on a divided highway, was struck by a
northbound car driven by White which had crossed the concrete median
divider. Johnson, also traveling south, then struck Allen's car from the
rear. The suit in the circuit court contained three counts, two by Richard
Allen for personal injuries and one by Allen's wife for loss of consortium.
In addition to White and Johnson, plaintiffs named as a defendant
Farmers Insurance Company which insured the plaintiffs' car. The petition
alleged that one of the contributing causes of White's crossing the median
was the act of an unknown driver who had suddenly cut in front of
White and into his lane of travel; that plaintiffs were insured under their
policy for all sums (up to specified limits) which they were legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle; and that under the policy definition the driver who cut in front
of defendant White was an uninsured motorist. Defendant Farmers Insurance filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of a misjoinder. The motion
stated 'that the suit against the insurer was based on contract, whereas
the claims against defendants White and Johnson were in tort, and that
the two types of claims could not be joined in a single action. The motion
apparently asserted a misjoinder of claims, but cited Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 52.0524 (hereinafter referred to as rule) which deals with
joinder of parties. The motion was overruled and Farmers applied for
a writ of prohibition.
B. The Court's Analysis
The supreme court considered the motion to be an assertion of both
misjoinder of claims and misjoinder of parties. The court held that joinder

21. Id. at 408.
22. State ex rel. Adrian Bank v. Luten, 488 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. En Banc 1973);
Wells v. Hartford Accident &Indemnity Co., 459 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. En Banc 1970 ;
State ex rel. Cozean v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d 377 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
23. 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
24. See rule quoted note 1 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/5
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of claims was governed by rule 55.06 (a). "2 Noting the broad language of
26
that rule and the Committee on Rules' explanation of its background,
the court held that contract and tort claims may be joined in the same
21
petition under its provisions.
Considering the assertion of misjoinder of parties, the court found
that rule 52.05 (a)28 was applicable. In discarding its previous narrow
interpretations of rule 52.05 (a), the court first turned to the pre-Campbell
authority for a liberal construction, citing Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville.2 9 That case had recognized the origin of the language and cited
United States Supreme Court and federal appellate court decisions sup30
porting the liberal policy of joinder embodied in federal rule 20 (a).
3
Cantrell further quoted from earlier Missouri authority to the same effect. '
The court noted that Cantrell, which was not followed in Campbell, was
more in harmony with the intent of the draftsmen of the federal rules. 32
Their intent was explained in a law review article by Professor Wright,33
which was quoted extensively by the majority in the Farmers opinion.
Aside from the actual intent of the draftsmen and the history of the
rule, the court found another of Professor Wright's arguments persuasive.
This argument is a logical comparison of the provisions for relation
back of amendments and for supplemental pleadings with the permissive
joinder and compulsory counterclaim requirements. The former provisions
are phrased in terms of "conduct, transaction or occurrence" and "transactions, occurrences, or events." If "transaction" is intended to mean
something less when coupled with "occurrence" than when standing
alone, then "transaction or occurence" should mean something narrower
when coupled with "conducte or "events." However, as Wright notes, no
one has ever attempted to state when a claim may be said to arise out of
the "conduct" or "event" relied on in another claim but not out of the
"transaction or occurrence." The real purpose in adding the extra

25. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.06 (a) providesA party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as
alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an
opposing party.
26. 518 S.W.2d at 657-58.
27. Id. at 658. The opinion does not state specifically whether this rule was
cited as direct support for the decision or as an analogy. Because the provision
by its own terms is limited to joinder of claims against a single party, a matter not
presented by this case, its usefulness in this case is limited to a demonstration of
the liberal policy underlying joinder.
28. See rule quoted note 1 supra.
29. 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949).
30. See cases cited note 17 supra.
31. Grue v. Hensley, 357 Mo. 592, 210 S.W.2d 7 (1948); Ritchie v. Hayward,
71 Mo. 560 (1880).
32. 518 S.W.2d at 660.
33. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1954).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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language in each of these rules, he concludes, was to guard against a
narrow construction of "transaction," rather than to restrict it.a4
.Finally, the court pointed out that Farmers' arguments against allowing joinder would lead to the illogical conclusion that the propriety
of joinder of an insurance carrier turns upon the carrier's initiative. Prior
Missouri cases held intervention by the insurer proper, thereby giving
the insurer the same rights as an original party, including the possibility
of securing a verdict in its favor.35 The court noted that the claims in
such case arise from a transaction and an occurrence. Thus, under Farmers'
urged interpretation, a claim arising from a transaction and a claim arising from an occurrence would be properly litigated in the same suit at the
carrier's initiative through intervention, but not at the plaintiff's initiative
through joinder.
The court noted that its decision does not allow joinder of a tortfeasor and his insurer prior to obtaining judgment against the tortfeasor because such direct action is prohibited by statute in Missouri.3 6
In the absence of statute, however, there is federal authority for the
37
propriety of such joinder.
C. Implications
The court has announced that it will consider federal authority very
persuasive in interpretation of the Missouri rules drawn from the federal
rules. It is also clear that the court will accord the joinder provisions a
liberal construction in order to give full effect to the broad policy of
liberal joinder urged by the advisory committees for both the federal and
Missouri rules. However, the precise basis for allowing joinder in Farmers
was never dearly enunciated. The words of the rule were never applied
to the facts.
From the court's discussion it appears that joinder was proper because the claims arose from the "same transaction."3 8 The court cited
with approval a definition of "transaction" from its 1948 opinion in
Grue v. Hensley.3 9 Grue indicated that "transaction" should be construed
broadly to include "all the circumstances which constitute the foundation
for a claim" 40 or "all the facts and circumstances out of which the injury
34. Id. at 450 n.125.
35. Wells v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 459 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. En
Bane 1970); Beard v. Jackson, 502 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); State
ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1963).
36. § 379.200, RSMo 1969. See State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, 359 Mo.
980, 224 S.W.2d 985 (En Banc 1949).
37. Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967). See also
Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969), where such joinder was permitted
under the rule.making power of the court.
38. 518 S.W.2d at 659-61.
39. 357 Mo. 592, 210 S.W.2d 7 (1948).
40. Id. at 597, 210 S.W.2d at 10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/5
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complained of . .. arose." 41 What is not clear from the opinion is the
court's treatment of the words "arising out of" and "same" which appear
42
in the language of the rule.
Must the facts which constitute the foundation for the claim against
one party include all the facts constituting the foundations for the claims
against all other parties before the latter claims may be said to "arise
out of" the "same" transaction upon which the first claim is based?
This question was not presented in Farmers and consequently was not
addressed in the opinion. The claim against Farmers was founded upon

the contract plus the accident and damages. The claim against the tortfeasors was based entirely upon the accident and damages. Because the
foundation of the claim against Farmers included the facts constituting
the claim against the other defendants, they clearly arose out of the

same transaction no matter how this question is answered. It is clear,
however, that the court's interpretation of this crucial language will be of
great concern to the practicing attorney in his determination of proper
parties. While a definite statement of the court's position cannot be
drawn from the opinion, some observations on the most likely interpretation may be helpful.
The court placed great emphasis on the source of the joinder provisions. As noted earlier, rule 52.05 is identical with federal rule 20. While
the interpretation of federal rule 20 by the federal courts was not
specifically held to be controlling, the court cited federal authority to
support its construction of the word "transaction." 43 One problem that
arises when using the federal cases even as persuasive authority, however,
is that the federal opinions are often phrased in the conclusory terms of
44
the rule and rarely articulate the factual basis supporting the result.
A recital of the facts alleged in the petition and a statement that the
claims arise out of the same transaction sheds little light on what the
transaction is and how much concurrence of facts is required for the claims

to "arise out of" the "same" transaction.
If an insurer commences a declaratory judgment action against the
insured and another insurer to determine which exclusive policy covers
the damages, is joinder based on the same transaction? Both contracts
of insurance must be alleged and proved; yet it would seem that a single
transaction could not include both contracts. If the insured claimed against
41. Id. This language was drawn from Ritchie v. Hayward, 71 Mo. 560, 562
(1880).
42. See rule quoted note 1 supra.
43. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Lesnik v.
Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).

44. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); Rumbaugh v.

Winifrede R.R. Co., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964);

United States v. Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 279 (D. Mont. 1971); Hanes

Dye & Finishing Co., Inc. v. Caissan Corp., 309 F. Supp 237 (M.D.N.C. 1970);
Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1967), affd per curiam, 389 U.S.
572 (1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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each insurer separately, in each suit he would prove only one contract
plus his damages. Joinder has been allowed on similar facts in the federal
courts based on the "same transaction" provision, yet the facts which
constituted the foundation for the claim were not articulated. 4" Allowing
joinder here would seem to support the position that the facts constituting the foundation for one claim need not include all the facts upon
which the other claims are based. If this is true then the limits should
be defined.
How much factual concurrence is necessary to make the claims
"arise out of" the "same" transaction? Analysis of federal cases interpreting the rule leads to the conclusion that the transaction upon which one
claim is based must include at least some of the factual basis for the
other claim before the claims will be held to arise out of the "same"
transaction. This common factual basis probably must be an essential
or material part of the claim, 46 although again the courts generally have
not articulated the factual basis found to be persuasive.
Support for an "essential or material part" test is also found in the
origin of the federal rules. In equity, all persons interested in a controversy could be made parties so that the entire matter could be settled
in one action. 47 This privilege was subject originally to the defense of
multifariousness, yet the court exercised discretion which eventually became so broad that it erased the defense. The report of the Committee
45. Great American Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Gas. Co., 285 F.2d 262 (4th
Cir. 1961); Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co., 241 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
46. See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974),
which interpreted rule 20 to permit "all reasonably related claims for relief by or
against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of
all events is unnecessary." Id. at 1333. See also Levey v. Roosevelt Federal Say. and
Loan Ass'n of St. Louis, 504 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
This concept is recognized by implication in Lumberman's Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Borden Co., 241 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the court said: "The
controversy between plaintiff and Affiliated [Insurance Co.] had a common source
and occurrence, namely the occurrence forming the basis of Borden's claims ......
Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
Support for this contention is also found in Eastern Fireproofing Co., Inc. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 160 F. Supp. 580 (D. Mass. 1958):
There are singularly few cases discussing what constitutes an identity
of transactions or occurrences. Obviously some additional elements or matters may be included, or it would not be possible to join even actions
against an agent and a principal, since more evidence is needed to establish
liability against the latter than the former. I believe there can be no hard
and fast rule, and that the approach must be the general one of whether
there are enough ultimate factual concurrences that it would be fair to
the parties to require them to defend jointly against them-at least to
some extent....
Id. at 581 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Har-Pen Truck Lines,
Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
47. For a thorough discussion of the origin of the federal rule, see 3A J.
MOORE,FEDERAL PRAMCE § 20.02 (2d ed. 1948); 7 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1651 (1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/5
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207

on Rules in 19374s specifically made reference to equity practice in recommending, adoption of the language drawn from the English rules which
were clearly based on the same principle. Convenience of the court
through prevention of multiple litigation of the same matters was stressed
and tempered only by proper regard for inconvenience to the parties.49
Thus the liberal interpretation of the rule urged by the draftsmen would
seem to require only that the transaction upon which one claim is based
include the factual basis of a material part of the claim against the
defendants to be joined. If there is no concurrence in the facts constituting the foundations of the claims, the other parties are not interested
in the same controversy. If the concurrence is not an essential or material
part of the foundation for the claims, it is unlikely to contribute substantially to the convenience of the court, and it is likely to be inconvenient
to the parties.
The primary advantage to be gained from such an interpretation is
that it would encourage the courts to articulate the factual basis for
allowance or denial of joinder. The current practice leads to uncertainty
and needless litigation because the holdings are couched in conclusory
terms. That the court in Farmers found it necessary to devote a nine
page opinion to the meaning of the term "transaction" (which was inconclusive at best) is ample evidence that a mere statement that these
claims did or did not arise out of the same transaction is highly undesirable and likely to continue to produce litigation. The extent to
which facts forming the foundations of the claims against each defendant
must coincide must also be articulated. A requirement that the common
facts and circumstances be a material or essential part of each claim
seems workable and consistent with the liberal policy announced by the
court. The relative ease with which this standard could be applied by
the plaintiff's attorney should result in fewer court determinations and
less inconvenience to the parties (the committee's articulated rationale
for the rule itself).
The Farmers decision has already been followed by the supreme

court,5 0 but the opinion failed to clarify what constitutes the "same
transaction." The court was satisfied to state that it would not follow a
narrower construction than that announced in Farmers, but declined
to comment on just what that construction was.

IV.

HAGER V. MCGLYNN 5 '

A. The Case
Plaintiff Howard Hager was injured when his automobile collided
48. The notes of the Advisory Committee are set forth in 12 C. WRIGH- 8
(1973).
49. See authorities cited note 47 supra.
50. State ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Scott, 521 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
51. 518 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).

A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACIE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 405
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with defendant McGlynn's automobile on January 12, 1969. On May 12,
1969, while on duty as a police officer, Hager was riding a motorcycle
when he was struck from the rear by defendant Tuttle's automobile.

Hager suffered injuries including aggravation of a previous knee injury
from the prior accident. Plaintiff filed his petition in two counts, one
against each defendant, and prayed damages separately against each defendant. Each defendant moved for a separate trial and such motions
were overruled. The jury found for the plaintiff against each defendant.
Defendant McGlynn appealed the denial of his motion for a separate
trial. The decision of the trial court was affirmed.
B. The Court's Analysis
Although an objection to joint trials may be made without objection
to joinder,5 2 the court of appeals understood the defendant's assignment
of error to be the allowance of joinder rather than abuse of the trial
court's discretion to conduct a joint trial where parties are properly
joined. The court noted that the case was one of first impression in
Missouri insofar as it presented the question of permissive joinder of
two defendants who collided with the plaintiff at different times with no
allegation of joint liability. The court distinguished cases involving
liability of the original tortfeasor for subsequent medical malpractice in
treatment of injuries 53 and joint liability of several tortfeasors acting
independently and at different times to produce a single indivisible
injury. 54 In this case, each tortfeasor was alleged to be liable only for the
injuries produced by his own act.
On the strength of an earlier decision that consolidation was proper
under similar facts,55 the court reasoned that the common question
requirement of the permissive joinder rule was satisfied. The court then
quoted extensively from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 58
where the joinder provisions are identical with those of Missouri, in a
case with very similar facts. The Ohio court, in holding that joinder is
permissible under such circumstances, relied on the language "series of
occurrences" found in the rule and emphasized the underlying policy of
allowing simplified pleading in order to prevent court congestion, multi52. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.05 (b) provides:
The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party
against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him,
and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
prejudice.
See also Mo. Sup. CT. R. 66.02.
53. State ex rel. Blond v. Stubbs, 485 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972),
permitted joinder in this situation.
54. Sutterfield v. District Court, 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968); Maddux
v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
55. State ex rel. Allen v. Yeaman, 440 S.W.2d 138 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
56. Ryan v. Mackolin, 14 Ohio St. 2d 213, 237 N.E.2d 377 (1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/5
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plicity of suits, and unjustified awards of damages. The court also found

persuasive the reasoning in a California case 57 with similar facts. The
California Supreme Court stressed the enhanced difficulty of proof in
separate trials and the more just awards to be expected when one jury
decides the damages to be apportioned to each party. The court of
appeals also declared that its decision had the support of the federal
courts passing upon this question. 58 The court flatly rejected an Illinois
appellate decision 59 taking the opposite view on similar facts, because
the Illinois court failed to make an analysis or address the merits of the
problem. 60
The court of appeals seemed to be most concerned with the overall
policy of liberal construction of procedural rules and the basic unfairness
of allowing each defendant to claim that the other caused the greater
part of the injury in a separate trial. The court expressed concern that
denial of joinder could lead to totally inadequate or totally outrageous
aggregate verdicts and would offer no greater protection to the rights of
the parties than would be afforded if joinder was allowed.
C. Implications
Hager is potentially much broader in scope and effect than Farmers.
The court's deference to the policy of liberal construction of the joinder
rule appears to be unchecked by the language of either of the rule's
requirements. If followed, this decision could well lead to an unwarranted
expansion of the joinder rule and conflict with the established policies
and requirements of venue, consolidation, and personal jurisdiction.

The common question requirement of the rule was deemed satisfied
by the court on the basis of its decision in State ex rel. Allen v. Yeamano'

that consolidation was proper on similar facts. Consolidation in Missouri is governed by rule 66.01 (b)62 which gives the trial court discretion
57. Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal. 2d 124, 148 P.2d 23 (1944).
58. Poster v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 25 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Pa. 1960), was
the only federal case cited by the court of appeals as support for this conclusion.
Actually, the court in Poster allowed joinder on the basis of the original tortfeasor's
possible liability for the aggravation and therefore termed the entire matter to be
a single occurrence. The court of appeals' approach does not appear to be supported by federal authority, although joinder has been allowed on similar facts
using the Poster rationale. Lucas v. City of Juneau, 15 Alas. 413, 127 F. Supp.
730 (D. Alas. 1955); Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D. Wis.
1965). See also Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
59. Sommers v. Korona, 54 Ill. App. 2d 425, 203 N.E.2d 768 (1964).
60. 518 S.W.2d at 177.
61. 440 S.W.2d 138 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
62. Mo. Sup. CT.R. 66.01 (b) provides:
When civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the civil actions; it may order all the civil actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(Emphasis added).
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'to join actions pending before it for hearing or trial although the parties to
one action do not thereby become parties to the other.68 The sole requirement of the rule is a common question of law or fact (which is
identical to the first requirement of the permissive joinder rule), although
the presence of a common question does not require that the motion for
consolidation be granted.6 4
The common question as defined by the court in Allen was, "to
what extent did [plaintiff's] injuries result from the first accident and to
what extent from the second." 65 If the rule is read literally, this would
not necessarily appear to be a common question-i.e., a question which
will be decided in each suit if it were tried as separate actions. In the suit
against the earlier tortfeasor, the plaintiff would likely be obliged to
introduce evidence in the form of expert testimony of his physical condition following the first accident. The jury would not be required nor
necessarily disposed to make a finding concerning injury in the second
accident either formally or implicitly. In his suit against the second
tortfeasor, the plaintiff may prove his present condition and introduce
evidence of his condition prior to the second accident. Even this approach
often does not yield a question common to the actions because the
implicit finding of the jury necessary to decide the question is the
plaintiff's condition prior to the second accident and not the plaintiff's
condition after the first. Bodily injuries are not necessarily permanent.
Some healing may be expected to occur, particularly in a case such as
the one most heavily relied upon by the court in Allen where there was
a time lapse of three years between accidents166 Of course, as a practical
matter there may be a common question if the first injury is permanent
or the time lapse between accidents is short. However, as will be discussed
later, the allowance of joinder has implications not presented by a
motion for consolidation. When joinder rather than consolidation is
before the court, a more critical inquiry into the common question
requirement may be appropriate.
Even if the common question requirement of the rule is conceded to
be satisfied, the "same . . . series of occurrences" requirement of rule
52.05 (a)67 is clearly not met by the facts in Hager. By the court's reasoning,
the successive occurrences of injury to the plaintiff's knee constituted a
series of occurrences. If this is so, then what is not a series of occurrences?
Is it any less a series of occurrences if the injuries are to the plaintiff
generally rather than to his knee? If viewed strictly from the plaintiff's
point of view, all injuries received during his lifetime, no matter how
63. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933); 9 C. WRIGHT
§ 2382 at 255 (1971).

A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
64. 9 C. WRIGHT A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
at 260 (1971); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 42.02 (2d ed. 1948).
65.. 440 S.W.2d at 145.
66. Shacter v. Richter, 271 Minn. 87, 135 N.W.2d 66 (1965).
67. See rule quoted note 1 supra.
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unrelated, can be said to be no less a series of occurrences than the separate
injuries to his knee. Yet should the plaintiff be permitted to join in one
suit all who injure him? It seems clear that to read the rule from the
plaintiff's point of view is to read the requirement of a series of occurrences completely out of the rule and make the requirement for joinder
and consolidation the same-i.e., a common question of law or fact.
The confusion in Hager which makes it seem to be a close case
arises from the court's failure to distinguish between a common factual
basis and a common question of fact. As discussed earlier in this comment,
the essence of the "same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions
or occurrences" 68 requirement is a common factual basis-i.e., events,
which must be alleged as an essential or material part of the claim against
each defendant. 69 The court in Hager deemed the "same . . . series of
occurrences" requirement to be .satisfied by the successive injuries to the
knee. However, the first defendant's liability was predicated solely upon
the first accident, and the second defendant's liability was based solely
on the second. Because the liability of neither defendant is based upon
a series of occurrences or events, it could not possibly be based upon the
same series. While the extent of injury to the knee caused by each defendant is arguably a common question of fact, it is in no sense an
event which is common to the claim against each.
It appears that both requirements of rule 52.05 (a) can have meaning
and be properly applied only if they are read in terms of the relationship
between the defendants. As is the case with several occurrences being
considered as one transaction,70 the liability of at least one defendant
must be based upon more than one event-i.e., a series of occurrences.
The liability of all other defendants must arise out of at least one of the
occurrences in this series. This provides the necessary relationship between
the defendants which justifies their joinder in one suit.71 This inter-

pretation of the rule is supported by the principle of equity joinder,

from which it was derived.7 2 In equity, joinder was based upon the
premise that all persons who were concerned with or involved in the
controversy should be present so that the entire matter could be settled
in one suit. If the plaintiff in his suit against defendant A based upon
occurrences X, Y, and Z also had a complaint against defendant B based
upon occurrence Z, then the matter should be settled in one action and A
and B should be joined. B has no reason to complain because he involved
68. Id.
69. See pt. III (c) of this comment, supra.
70. Id.
71. Multifariousness as to parties consists of joining in the same suit,
either as complainants or defendants, parties who are without a common
interest in the subject of the litigation and have no connection with each
other.
Meyer v. Mulligan, 175 S.W.2d 924, 929 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (emphasis added).
72. See pt. III (c) of this comment and notes 47-49 supra.
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himself in occurrence Z. He is further protected under rule 52.05 (b)"a
because a separate trial of X and Y may be ordered if B would be unduly
prejudiced. The Hager pleadings, however, clearly do not fall under this
principle because the plaintiffs complaint against defendant A arose
solely out of occurrence X and his complaint against defendant B arose
solely out of occurrence Y. Defendant B's objection is justified because he
has nothing to do with (and has probably never heard of) defendant A
or occurrence X. The federal cases cited as authority in Hager do follow
this principle because those cases were brought on a theory that the
first defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the damages in
the second accident.7 4
The above discussion is not intended to imply that the facts of
Hager cannot support joinder in the proper circumstances. If the complaint against the first defendant alleged that the first defendant had
caused the knee to be in such condition that it was more seriously injured
in the second accident than it would have been but for the first accident,
the plaintiff would satisfy the above test because the liability of the first
defendant is now based on a series of occurrences-i.e., two accidents, and
because the liability of the second defendant is based on one of those
accidents, they arise from the same series of occurrences. While it is clear
that not all situations similar to Hager will be susceptible of such an
allegation, the distinction between this allegation and that made in Hager
highlights the potential scope of the Hager decision which is discussed
below.
As noted above, the court's interpretation of the rule, together with
the emphasis on the totally separate allegations of liability of the individual
defendants for each accident, leads to the conclusion that joinder is proper
whenever consolidation is proper. The effect of the decision upon venue
and personal jurisdiction was not considered by the court, however, and
this effect clearly indicates the impropriety of erasing the distinction between joinder and consolidation requirements. Consolidation is governed
by rule 66.0l.T5 While the rule's major justifications are convenience of
the court and avoidance of inconsistent adjudications, there is one major
limitation. Both suits to be consolidated must be pending before the
court entertaining the motion.7 6 The issues of venue and personal jurisdiction are already settled in each suit before the motion and are unaffected if the suits are consolidated for trial.
The context in which the determination of proper permissive joinder
arises is entirely different from that of consolidation. The issues of
venue and personal jurisdiction are still unresolved and are often contingent upon proper joinder. The Missouri venue statute makes venue
73. See rule quoted note 52 supra.
74. See note 58 supra.
75. See rule quoted note 62 supra.

76. Id.
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for all defendants proper in the county of residence of any defendant.7
This has been dearly interpreted to mean that "the question of venue
is to be resolved by the determination of whether or not the defendant.
was properly joined . . ." 8 It is also clear from ample Missouri case law
that proper venue is necessary before service of process will confer jurisdiction over the person of a defendant.7 9 While this is in the nature of
a personal right and may be waived, 0 absence of personal jurisdiction
may not be remedied by the unilateral action of the court or the plaintiff.
The plaintiff may obtain a writ of prohibition in defense of his right in
advance of the trial on the merits.8 ' While no doubt the state has the
power to require its residents to appear in any county, the clear scheme
of the venue provisions requires some relationship of the defendant,
established by his own conduct, to the place of trial or the other defendant.
This relationship can be assured only by reading the first requirement of
the joinder rule from the perspective of the defendants.
The potentially broad effect of Hager should now be dear. Allowance
of joinder based solely on a common question of law or fact would greatly
expand the jurisdiction of the courts over the persons of defendants
who have no relationship to the forum aside from the unhappy circumstance that their suits involve a question of law or fact common to a suit
pending in that jurisdiction. On its facts, the Hager decision does not
seem to reach an onerous or objectionable result. However, the effect
of granting the plaintiff a right to extend the jurisdiction of the court
over a defendant from a foreign county based solely Upon a common
question is indeed objectionable. As noted earlier, if the first defendant is
somehow responsible for part of plaintiff's injuries in the second accident,
joinder appears to be proper. The first defendant should not complain
because he has, by his own conduct, caused injury to a plaintiff of such
character as to make the plaintiff more susceptible to the second injury.
The second defendant's conduct can have no bearing on the propriety
of joinder. Because joinder of the second defendant may force him to
defend where venue and jurisdiction would otherwise not be proper,
a more critical inquiry into the common question requirement may be
appropriate for his protection.

77. Section 508.010, RSMo 1969, provides:
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought:

(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in different-counties, the suit may be brought in any such county.
78. State ex rel. Cozean v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d 377 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
79. State ex rel. Carney v. Higgins, 352 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. En Banc 1961); State
ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W.2d 393 (En Banc 1951); State

ex rel. Rhine v. Montgomery, 422 S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).

80. State ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 348 Mo. 525, 154 S.W.2d 52 (En Banc
1941).
81. State ex rel. Adrian Bank v. Luten, 488 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
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CONCLUSION

The policy of liberal construction of the Missouri Supreme Court
Rules relating to joinder announced by the court in Farmers is amply
supported by the history of the rules and sound reasoning. It is a welcome

and substantial step toward full implementation of modern pleading
reforms. The holding that an action in tort against one party may be

joined with an action in contract against another brings Missouri into
harmony with the majority of jurisdictions with similar provisions and
with most, if not all, commentators in the field. However, a clear in-

terpretation of the "same transaction" requirement is essential to application of the rule by the practicing bar and to prevention of unnecessary
litigation over what is or is not the "same transaction." The "same
transaction" requirement should be interpreted to mean simply that the
factual basis of the claim against one party must include the factual basis
of an essential or material part of the claims against all other parties.
This construction would serve as an authoratitive and straightforward
test which could easily be applied. It is also the most liberal construction
of the language of the rule which can be supported by its historical
developmen't..
The Hager decision should be disapproved because it would lead to
the elimination of the first requirement of the rule. Because all events in
the plaintiff's life are a "series of occurrences" from his perspective, the requirement would be satisfied in every case. The requirements for joinder
and consolidation would then be the same. The legislative decision that
the relationship between defendants is sufficient to justify venue and personal jurisdiction in the county of either defendant only when the dual
requirements of joinder are met should lead the courts to question seriously
any construction which would eliminate one of these requirements. Such an
expansion of. venue and personal jurisdiction seems unnecessary and unwarranted. The history of the rule clearly indicates that it applies to the
relationship between the defendants and should be interpreted from their
perspective. Such an interpretation would certainly be in harmony with
the decision of the supreme court in Farmers.
LAWRENCE
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